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21st Century Futurama: Contemplating Removal of 
Urban Freeways in the World of Tomorrow 
Jessica Kraft-Klehm 
INTRODUCTION 
Cities all across the country are in various stages of contemplating 
or planning for the removal of segments of freeway running through 
their urban cores.
1
 These freeway removal projects are becoming a 
growing trend in urban planning.
2
 The concept is being discussed in 
greater frequency as a viable mechanism for urban development 
because many of the freeway structures subject to removal proposals 
have reached or are reaching the end of their design lifespan
3
 and 
need structural attention.
4
 New Urbanists
5
 see the removal of portions 
 
 
 J.D. (2015), Washington University School of Law. 
 1. See JOSEPH F. C. DIMENTO & CLIFF ELLIS, CHANGING LANES: VISIONS AND 
HISTORIES OF URBAN FREEWAYS 228 (2013). See also Bruce Eggler, Claiborne Avenue 
Expressway Demolition Gets Support in Report, TIMES-PICAYUNE (July 22, 2010, 3:30 PM) 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/07/claiborne_avenue_expressway_de.html (New 
Orleans); Sam Levin, Gateway Arch 2015: New Details in Massive Redesign, Museum, 
Riverfront Plans (PHOTOS), RIVERFRONT TIMES BLOG (Apr. 17, 2013, 12:34 PM), 
http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/dailyrft/2013/04/gateway_arch_2015_redesign_photos.php (St. 
Louis); and William Yardley, Seattle, After Decades of Debate, Approves Tunnel, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/us/19seattle.html?r=0 (Seattle).  
 2. See Highways to Boulevards, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM, http://www.cnu. 
org/highways (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
 3. According to an assessment and reconstruction plan of the regional freeway system of 
Southeastern Wisconsin, the typical lifespan of a freeway pavement before reconstruction is 
needed is forty to fifty years, and twenty to twenty-five years before an initial re-pavement is 
needed. See SE. WIS. REG’L PLANNING COMM’N, A REGIONAL FREEWAY SYSTEM 
RECONSTRUCTION PLAN FOR SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN 81–82 (2003), available at 
http://maps.sewrpc.org/freewaystudy/. The typical lifespan for bridges designed with modern 
standards implemented in the last thirty to forty years is seventy to seventy-five years, and 
considerably less for older bridges. Id. at 89.  
 4. See Mary Ebeling, Rethinking the Urban Freeway Options for Rebuilding, Replacing, 
Altering or Otherwise Addressing Aging Freeways, MAYORS INNOVATION PROJECT (Nov. 
2013), http://mayorsinnovation.org/pdf/SURDNA_freeway%20brief.pdf. 
 5. New Urbanism developed as a response to post World War II land development, 
which was characterized by sharp separation of uses and facilitated urban sprawl. See James A. 
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of urban, often elevated, freeway structures as opportunities to 
redress the negative impacts urban freeway construction had on the 
American metropolis and spur economic development and downtown 
revitalization.
6
 
Urban freeway planning began in the 1930s.
7
 Urban planners saw 
the urban freeway as a solution to the growing traffic congestion 
resulting from the accessibility and popularity of the automobile,
8
 as 
well as an answer to the increase in “urban blight” neighborhoods.9 
These dilapidated districts surrounded high-value properties in many 
cities’ central business districts and could easily be cleared out and 
replaced by transportation conduits.
10
 Early automobile-era urban 
planners struggled to make urban freeways compatible with their 
current metropolitan landscapes.
11
 In the early 1930s, Suburban and 
rural limited-access parkways complete with scenic greenways were 
aspirational for urban freeways
12
 but only truly existed on the urban 
fringe.
13
 Planners were forced to compromise these principles given 
the need to traverse dense urban cores and thus considered elevated 
structures as a reasonable alternative, especially in urban central 
 
Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism and Diversity: Progressive Movements in America and 
Their Impact on Poor and Minority Populations, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 46–48 
(2002). The Congress for New Urbanism is a leading promoter of New Urbanism principles. 
See Learn About New Urbanism, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM, https://www.cnu.org/ 
who_we_are (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
 6. See CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM, supra note 2. 
 7. DIMENTO & ELLIS, supra note 1, at 24. 
 8. There was nearly a 200 percent increase in the number of automobiles in the United 
States during the 1920s. See TOM LEWIS, DIVIDED HIGHWAYS 20 (2013). By 1929, there were 
26.5 million automobiles, approximately one for every four Americans. Id. While automobile 
growth stagnated during the height of the Depression, urban congestion did not abate. 
DIMENTO & ELLIS, supra note 1, at 23. 
 9. Id. at 28. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at 29. “In the 1930s, city planners and engineers hoped that the freeway would be a 
manageable insertion into the urban fabric.” Id. at 42. 
 12. DIMENTO & ELLIS, supra note 1, at 24, 29–33 (explaining Robert Moses’ New York 
City parkways that “pushed into urban centers” served as an influential example, and describing 
urban parkway designs in Boston, Chicago and Los Angeles). In his plans for Boston’s Central 
Artery, city planner Robert Whitten described the need for “a pleasant, park-like appearance 
that will add some elements of interest and distinction to the neighborhood through which it 
passes.” Id. at 42.  
 13. Id. at 23. 
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business districts.
14
 The 1939 New York World’s Fair introduced 
Americans to the “World of Tomorrow”15 through Norman Bel 
Geddes’s Futurama exhibit: a vision of a 1960s city crisscrossed by a 
network of elevated superhighways.
16
 The American people were on 
board, and the major roadblock on the path to saving America’s 
declining cities was funding. 
The Federal-Aid Highway Act, through permutations discussed in 
greater detail below, funded the vast majority of urban freeways. But 
the effects of urban freeways were not as these early twentieth 
century city planners supposed. Freeways offered (predominantly 
white) Americans a way out of the cities.
17
 Since the beginning of 
suburbanization in the 1950s, the population density of 522 central 
cities declined by 50 percent.
18
 Decentralization of the metropolitan 
region has left inner cities with declining economic and social 
conditions.
19
 As the wealthy tax base leaves the city, relying on the 
automobile for transportation, so too do businesses, leaving behind 
abandoned and often contaminated real estate, high unemployment 
 
 14. See id. at 31 (explaining Whitten’s realizations that “elevated highways were the only 
workable means of traversing densely built-up downtown areas in the absence of preexisting 
linear corridors such as rivers or vacant waterfront lands”). 
 15. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 193 (slogan adopted by the 1939 New York World’s Fair).  
 16. See DIMENTO & ELLIS, supra note 1, at 46–53 for a discussion of Bel Geddes 
World’s Fair exhibit, sponsored, not surprisingly, by General Motors and Shell Oil, and his 
subsequent book, Magic Motorways. Interestingly, Bel Geddes did not advocate for 
interregional highways to cut through cities; however, his vision for smaller “feeder roads” and 
“express boulevards” to cut into city centers still employed the elevated, limited-access 
highway design. Id. at 48–49. 
 17. See Clayton Nall, The Political Consequences of Spatial Policies: How Interstate 
Highways Facilitated Geographic Polarization, 77 J. POL. 394, 395–96 (2015). See also J. 
Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The 
Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 565 (2007). 
 18. See Georgette Chapman Poindexter, Land Hungry, 21 J.L. & POL. 293, 312 (2005). 
 19. See Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space and Place: The Geography of Economic 
Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 352 (1999), who describes the contributing structural 
conditions: 
[A]s urban sprawl relocates persons to the periphery of metropolitan areas, further and 
further away from the core, the core inevitably suffers from depleted financial, social, 
and human resources that have relocated to the suburbs. [Moreover,] fragmented local 
government erects jurisdictional boundaries that insulate wealthier suburban areas 
from any responsibility for the communities and people within cities that are left 
behind. [Further,] both historical and current policies further contribute to inner-city 
marginalization by insulating and benefiting suburban communities. 
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rates, and a poor and disadvantaged subset of the population unable 
to move or access now remote jobs.
20
  
Part I of this Note explains the freeway’s arrival and prominence 
in urban centers as a product of the national transportation policy, 
which has evolved significantly under the Federal-Aid Highway Acts 
and their modern equivalents. 
Part II is an overview of completed freeway teardown projects, 
which are often cited by cities in contemplation of their own freeway 
removal proposals. The removal of the Park East Freeway in 
Milwaukee is discussed in greater detail because although a model, it 
is not perfect and exemplifies many of the issues facing cities that are 
currently contemplating freeway removal. 
Part III will discuss the benefits of urban freeway removal and 
considers some of the hurdles that freeway removal proponents must 
overcome as well as factors of success. Finally, I propose that 
national transportation policy should be revised to actively promote 
urban freeway removal projects. 
I. EARLY FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN URBAN INTERSTATE 
CONSTRUCTION AND THE FEDERAL AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1956 
The U.S. National Highway System
21
 is “the largest civil 
engineering project in human history.”22 Its implementation is largely 
credited to President Dwight D. Eisenhower
23
 with the passage of the 
 
 20. See generally Hope Babcock, The National Environmental Policy Act in the Urban 
Environment: Oxymoron or a Useful Tool to Combat the Destruction of Neighborhoods and 
Urban Sprawl?, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 (2008) (summarizing the various deleterious effects 
of urban sprawl on the environment, urban populations, and the economy). 
 21. National Highway System, 23 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 22. Tom Chaffin, The Interstates Turn 50, TIME.COM (June 26, 2006), http://content.time. 
com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1207986,00.html. 
 23. Credit to Eisenhower is demonstrated by the Interstate system’s official title: The 
Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, so named by 
Congress in 1990. See Act of Oct. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-427, 104 Stat. 927 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). Eisenhower had a personal interest in a 
cohesive system of national roads since 1919, an early point in his military career. See generally 
The 1919 Transcontinental Motor Convoy, EISENHOWER PRES. LIBRARY, MUSEUM & 
BOYHOOD HOME, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/1919_ 
convoy.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2015). Following World War I, the Motor Transport Corps of 
the United States Army, concerned about the possibility of a homeland attack by an Asian 
nation, lead the first motor convoy across the United States as a means of testing travel and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/14
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Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956.
24
 The 1956 Act was unique from 
its predecessors in two essential respects. The first was the creation of 
the Highway Trust, a combination of federal funds and gasoline taxes 
to finance interstate construction, the idea being that through the 
Highway Trust the federal government can fund interstate highway 
construction projects without incurring a deficit.
25
 The second was an 
increase in the ratio of federal to state financial contribution to 90 
percent federal and 10 percent state.
26
 Touted as essential to national 
 
response time. As a member of the caravan, Eisenhower experienced all of the trials and 
tribulations that a rudimentary and wholly incomplete system of roads had to offer: the convoy 
took sixty-two days, traveling at an average speed of 6.07 miles per hour, to reach the West 
Coast, demonstrating the need for a high-speed, intercontinental road network. See WILLIAM C. 
GREANY, PRINCIPAL FACTS CONCERNING THE FIRST TRANSCONTINENTAL ARMY MOTOR 
TRANSPORT EXPEDITION, WASHINGTON TO SAN FRANCISCO, JULY 7 TO SEPTEMBER 6, 1919, 
available at http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/1919_convoy/ 
principal_facts .pdf (last accessed Dec. 19, 2015). During his presidency, Eisenhower got the 
attention of both state governors and highway lobbyists. In a Presidential address delivered by 
Vice President Nixon to the conference of state governors in 1954, Eisenhower called for a $50 
billion highway program, in the name of safety and national security, with self-liquidated 
financing to avoid the debt of construction. See Richard F. Weingroff, Federal-Air Highway Act 
of 1956: Creating the Interstate System, 60 PUB. ROADS 1 (1996), available at http://www. 
fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/ 96summer/p96su10.cfm. 
 24.  Federal Aid-Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, § 108(l), 70 Stat. 374 (1956) 
(codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 101–166 (2012)). However, the inception for a unified 
transcontinental system of roads predates the Eisenhower administration. The first federally 
aided highway program was in 1916, and it focused on farm to market highways and 
connecting county seats. HELEN LEAVITT, SUPERHIGHWAY—SUPERHOAX 25 (1970). Many of 
these early projects lacked coordination between federal, state, and county officials, resulting in 
paved roads with no discernable beginning and endpoint that would abruptly end at county or 
state lines. Id. at 24. In 1937, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt crudely drew a series of 
lines running north and south, and east and west across a map for then Bureau of Roads Chief 
Thomas McDonald. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 50. FDR’s inception resulted in the Federal-Aid 
Highway Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-521, 58 Stat. 838 (1944), directing the Bureau of Public 
Roads to make plans for a national system of roads. Id. In the years prior to 1956, lack of 
federal funding devoted to interstate road construction meant that little construction progress 
was made. By 1953, only approximately 24 percent of interstates were suitable for travel. 
Weingroff, supra note 23. 
 25. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 119. The Interstate Highway Program was initially perceived 
as a self-financed project. Id. at 99. This proved not to be the case, so the federal government 
increased its contributions to the Highway Trust significantly early on in the program to ensure 
its success. Id. at 144. One reason is because the initial price quoted for the entire system was 
hastily drawn up and unsupported. Id. at 143. Additionally, the initial planners did not consider 
just how much more difficult freeway construction in densely populated city centers would be 
in comparison to rural areas, where land and the costs of dislocating its occupants were 
significantly less. Id. at 175. See also DIMENTO & ELLIS, supra note 1, at 108–09. 
 26. See LEWIS, supra note 8, at 121–22. Prior to the 1956 Act, the federal to state ratio for 
national highway projects was fifty-fifty. LEAVITT, supra note 24, at 25. The Federal Aid Road 
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defense,
27
 the 1956 Act called for a unified system of forty-one 
thousand miles of interstate to be built over thirteen years.
28
  
With the plan set, construction took off. Accompanying the 1956 
Act, and perhaps a large reason for its successful passage through 
Congress, was the Bureau of Public Road’s publication, General 
Location of National System of Interstate Highway Including All 
Additional Routes at Urban Areas, known as “The Yellow Book” 
(due to the color of its cover page).
29
 The Yellow Book mapped out 
the entire Interstate Highway System in thick black lines, including 
one line through nearly every metropolitan city.
30
 Prior to the 1956 
Act’s enactment, the Bureau of Public Roads had yet to designate the 
last 2,175 miles of Interstate highways; the Bureau selected their 
placement in cities.
31
  
Only three years after highway construction began under the 1956 
Act, reformers raised questions as to whether the Act was intended to 
devote so much of its interstate funds to serve intracity transportation 
 
Act 1916 authorized $75 million over five years to get traffic “out of the mud.” MARK H. ROSE 
& RAYMOND A. MOHL, INTERSTATE HIGHWAY POLITICS AND POLICY SINCE 1939 8 (3d ed. 
2012). The Act’s renewal in 1921 authorized the expenditure of $75 million for that year alone. 
Id. At the time, highway construction efforts were conducted solely by state road agencies with 
little consideration for collaborative interstate construction efforts. Id. However, the Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1938 authorized the Bureau of Public Roads to assess the proposed 
construction of a small network of six transcontinental highways. DIMENTO & ELLIS, supra 
note 1, at 133. Furthermore, some toll roads were constructed and provided significant revenues 
for the states, but due to their expense, they did not attract city traffic. LEAVITT, supra note 24, 
at 39.  
 27. See 23 U.S.C. § 101(b)(2) (declaring that “the prompt and early completion of the 
Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways . . . so named 
because of its primary importance to the national defense, is essential to the national interest”). 
National defense was the major theme supporting federal financing of highway projects during 
World War II, primarily to aid the movement of troops, war materials and supplies. LEAVITT, 
supra note 24, at 25. Following the war, Eisenhower continued to use the national defense 
rationale to support his proposed $50 billion interstate project when he described the current 
network of roads as “appalling inadequacies to meet the demands of catastrophe or defense, 
should an atomic war come.” Weingroff, supra note 23.  
 28. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 127. 
 29. Id. at 120–21. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. The guaranteed construction projects for cities represented by members of 
Congress gave an incentive to vote for the highway bill, if not a justification, for voting to 
increase federal taxes on fuel to fund the Highway Trust. Id. Only one congressman whose 
represented city appeared in The Yellow Book voted against the 1956 highway bill, and he did 
not see another term in Congress. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/14
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needs.
32
 Eisenhower himself was allegedly disturbed by the amount 
of highway construction targeted at city centers after seeing firsthand 
the construction efforts and resulting congestion while stuck in traffic 
on the way to Camp David in the spring of 1959.
33
 Eisenhower 
directed General John Stewart Bragdon
34
 to study the Interstate 
Program’s current policies regarding financing, planning, and 
supervising highway construction, with a particular emphasis on 
“intra-metropolitan area routing” and “urban planning.”35 Bragdon 
made a strong case to Eisenhower opposing highway construction in 
cities under the Interstate Highway Program.
36
 Bertram Tallamy, then 
head of the Bureau of Public Roads and administrator of the 
Interstate Highway Program, countered Bragdon’s argument by 
 
 32. See id. at 145–46. See also Gary T. Schwartz, Urban Freeways and the Interstate 
System, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 406, 445–48, 470–71 (1976) (discussing in part the general 
understanding of the Act’s purpose and ambiguity of the Act’s language as it relates to 
interstate-intracity dynamic). Section 116(b) of the 1956 Act reads: 
Insofar as possible in consonance with this objective [the “prompt completion” of the 
System], existing highways located on an interstate route shall be used to the extent 
that such use is practicable, suitable, and feasible, it being the intent that local needs, to 
the extent practicable, suitable, and feasible, shall be given equal consideration with 
the needs of interstate commerce. 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, ch. 462, § 116(b), 70 Stat. 385 (1956) 
(emphasis added). The Bureau of Public Roads interpreted the “equal consideration clause” 
broadly, such that when planning that Interstate System as a whole as well as each individual 
segment, “the same amount of consideration” should be given to the needs of both local traffic 
and interstate commerce traffic. Schwartz, supra, at 471. Alternatively, Section 116(b) could be 
read much more narrowly to give “equal consideration” only with respect to the question of 
incorporating existing highways into the system or building new ones. Id. The Justice 
Department determined that either interpretation is legally defensible and refused to weigh in on 
what policy considerations should determine the appropriate interpretation. Id. 
 33. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 145. 
 34. General Bragdon was a former West Point classmate of Eisenhower and later directed 
the Public Works Planning Unit of Eisenhower’s Council of Economic Advisers. Id. at 101. 
During the administration’s pre-1956 Act discussions of how to create and fund the interstate 
highway project, Bragdon was a proponent of a simple system of transcontinental roads, similar 
to those initially proposed by Roosevelt, built entirely under the control of the federal 
government, and financed by a toll system. Id. at 102. Most importantly, Bragdon believed that 
the federal government should have no part in financing intracity transportation through the 
interstate highway program: highways through cities were meant for through traffic. The 
amount of egresses required to accommodate the needs of local traffic constituted a substantial 
and unforeseen burden on the federal highway budget. Id. at 148. 
 35. Id. at 146 (quoting from “Bragdon[‘s] Papers” located at the Dwight David 
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas). 
 36. Id. at 146–47, 151. 
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brandishing The Yellow Book.
37
 Tallamy declared the law was on his 
side as Congress, by adopting The Yellow Book, acknowledged the 
planned urban routes prior to the passage of the 1956 Act, further 
showing it intended to devote funds to intracity transportation 
needs.
38
 Although it was Eisenhower who requested the report, 
Bragdon’s arguments were ultimately met by silence from the 
president, and no planned urban routes were abandoned.
39
 
A. Freeway Revolt and Changes to the Federal-Air Highway Act of 
the 1960s and 1970s 
Beginning in the 1960s and continuing heavily into the 1970s, 
urban activists strongly opposed freeway construction.
40
 Initially, the 
ability of the freeway opposition to counteract construction of 
highways though city centers was weak.
41
 Citizens whose 
neighborhoods were targeted for disruption due to planned highway 
paths had little political or economic clout to reroute construction.
42
 
 
 37. Id. at 151. 
 38. Id. at 148–49, 151. 
 39. Id. at 151. Bragdon was soon thereafter removed from the urban interstate debate 
when the president nominated him to an unexpired term as a commissioner on the Civil 
Aeronautics Board. Id. 
 40. Literature of the time included A. Q. MOWBRAY, ROAD TO RUIN (1969); HELEN 
LEAVITT, SUPERHIGHWAY—SUPERHOAX (1970); ALBERT BENJAMIN KELLEY, THE PAVERS 
AND THE PAVED (1971); DAVID G. BURWELL & MARY ANN WILNER, END OF THE ROAD: A 
CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMSOLVING (1977). See also JANE JACOBS, THE 
DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 150–51 (2d ed. 1961) (calling for high densities 
of population and activities, mixtures of primary uses, small-scale, pedestrian-friendly blocks 
and streets, and the preservation of old buildings alongside the newly constructed; all these 
principles are at odds with separate use Euclidean zoning which allowed for suburbanization 
with the support of freeway travel). 
 41. ROSE & MOHL, supra note 26, at 113. 
 42. See id. This was particularly true in African American communities, not only because 
they lacked political leverage, but also because routes through African American communities 
were supported by the dominant white communities. Id. In New Orleans, the construction of an 
elevated highway through the city’s historic French Quarter that would have cut off the 
neighborhood from the Mississippi riverfront was met with opposition of residents, 
businessmen, and preservationists and was well-organized by two educated young men from 
connected New Orleans families. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 182, 189–90. They were equipped for 
the uphill battle, which lasted nearly half a decade. Id. at 195–210. In contrast, the construction 
of Interstate 10 though New Orleans’s prosperous African American community on Claiborne 
Avenue was met with no opposition. Id. at 188. When the elevated Interstate was superimposed 
onto Claiborne Avenue, historic large oak trees that lined the street were removed for the 
construction and its once prosperous businesses and festivities dissipated. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/14
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Furthermore, these citizens had few legal tools at their disposal.
43
 The 
federal highway builders viewed public hearings as a method of 
furnishing citizens with information, not as a mechanism for them to 
voice their concerns.
44
  
As a response to the opposition, the transportation legislation and 
implementation that followed in the 1960s and 1970s realized a 
gradual policy shift from a construction-centric view of highways as 
the savior of the blighted city, to transportation planning and highway 
construction within a greater urban context.
45
 The Federal-Aid 
Highway Act of 1962 required, for the first time, the integration of 
highway planning and metropolitan planning.
46
 It required federally-
funded urban freeway projects be based on “a continuing, 
comprehensive transportation planning process carried out 
 
 43. See Oliver A. Houck, More Unfinished Stories: Lucas, Atlanta Coalition, and 
Palila/Sweet Home, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 375–76 (2004) (describing the unanticipated 
opposition to freeway construction by white, middle-class residents and their relative lack of 
legal recourse during the construction boom of the 1950s and 1960s); Jerry L. Mashaw, The 
Legal Structure of Frustration: Alternative Strategies for Public Choice Concerning Federally 
Aided Highway Construction, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1973) (explaining the challenges facing the 
highway litigant, in both state and federal courts). An early exception is San Francisco’s 
opposition to the continued construction of the Embarcadero Freeway, a double-decked, 
partially completed pre-interstate freeway that ran along the city’s bayfront harbor. ROSE & 
MOHL, supra note 26, at 115. Plans to complete the freeway stretch using interstate funds were 
met by a powerful coalition of upscale neighborhood associations, environmental groups, a 
“locally oriented board of supervisors,” and an eventual commitment to public transit by city 
businesses and political figures. Id. Unique to San Francisco’s situation was a California state 
law that provided no street or road could be closed without the approval of the local 
government authorities. Id. at 116. Continuation of the construction of the Embarcadero would 
require multiple road closures, and the locally minded San Francisco Board of Supervisors 
stonewalled the construction by exercising its veto power. Id.  
 44. The role of the public hearing is thus explained: “[t]he department is there to inform 
the public of its plans and to hear from them. It is under no obligation to make an affirmative 
case or to subject its project rationale to cross-examination.” Mashaw, supra note 43, at 24. See 
also Schwartz, supra note 32, at 481–82 n.455 (explaning of the origins of the public hearing 
requirement within the 1956 Act, its limited scope of examining only “economic effects,” and 
the 1968 Act’s amendment widening the scope of the public hearing requirement to include 
consideration of “social,” “environmental,” and “urban planning effects”). 
 45. See DIMENTO & ELLIS, supra note 1, at 132, 142. The legislation of the 1960s that 
went hand in glove with the updates to the Federal-Aid Highway Acts includes the National 
Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915; the Civil Rights Act of 
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (specifically, Title VIII, The Fair Housing Act, 82 Stat. at 
81); and, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852. 
 46. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-866, 76 Stat. 1145 (current 
version at 23 U.S.C. §§ 101–166 (2012)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
214 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 49:205 
 
 
cooperatively by states and local communities” that conform with the 
national objective of developing multi-modal transportation 
systems.
47
 The 1962 Act was later amended to further require the 
federal government to give “due consideration” to the “probable 
effect” of highway projects on urban areas.48 However, it was 
decidedly unnecessary to revisit freeway routes that were already 
planned as of 1955 (i.e. those proposed in The Yellow Book), prior to 
the 1956 Highway Act.
49
 As a result, these enumerated expectations 
saw little actual implementation.
50
 The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 
1968,
51
 in addition to declaring a national policy of preservation for 
public parks, wildlife refuges, and historic sites,
52
 also mandated 
relocation and housing replacements for displaced citizens as a result 
of highway construction.
53
 The Federal Highway Act of 1973
54
 
allowed federal funds via the Highway Trust to be used not only for 
Interstate construction projects, but also for public transportation.
55
 
Environmental protections incorporated into legislation during the 
second half of the 1960s provided highway opponents the first 
substantial legal standing to challenge highway construction.
56
 One 
 
 47. 76 Stat. at 1148. 
 48. DIMENTO & ELLIS, supra note 1, at 139. 
 49. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 461. 
 50. DIMENTO & ELLIS, supra note 1, at 119. 
 51. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, 82 Stat. 815. 
 52. § 138, 82 Stat. at 124–25. See also infra note 5560. 
 53. §§ 501-11, 82 Stat. at 830-35. See also DIMENTO & ELLIS, supra note 1, at 128–29. 
Similar requirements had been in place for federally funded urban renewal projects since the 
1950s. ROSE & MOHL, supra note 26, at 145–46. 
 54. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–87, 87 Stat. 250 (1973). 
 55. § 142, 87 Stat. at 259-61. See also LEWIS, supra note 8, at 233. The congressional 
compromise for the 1973 Act phased in the use of Trust Fund money for public transportation 
beginning in 1975, and by 1976, cities were allowed to use any amount of their allotted 
highway funds for public transit projects. Id. As of 1974, however, projects already in their 
construction stages would continue with funding as planned. Id.  
 56. See ROSE & MOHL, supra note 26, at 137–38; see also Roger Nober, Federal 
Highways and Environmental Litigation: Toward a Theory of Public Choice and 
Administrative Reaction, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 229, 230–34 (1990). Much planned highway 
construction utilized public land, giving opponents the opportunity to disrupt planned routes. 
See id. at 248 (early highway construction proposals expressed a preference to route highways 
through parks and other publically owned land). See also Tannera George Gibson, Not in My 
Neighborhood: Memphis and the Battle to Preserve Overton Park, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 725, 
729 (2011) (noting the convenience of using publically owned parkland, which drastically 
reduced construction costs); NAT’L INTERREGIONAL HIGHWAY COMM., INTERREGIONAL 
HIGHWAYS, H.R. DOC. NO. 379, at 69 (2d Sess. 1944) (noting “the valley of a small stream 
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protection came with the enactment of Section 4(f) of the Department 
of Transportation Act of 1966.
57
 Section 4(f) mandated that special 
efforts be made to protect the environment in developing 
transportation plans.
58
 Section 4(f) was a substantive law intended to 
prevent the routing of highways through public parks unless no 
“feasible and prudent alternative”59 route exists and all possible 
efforts are made to minimize the harm if there is no such 
alternative.
60
 The second protection came with the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
61
 which requires federally aided 
highway projects to study potential environmental impacts before 
federal funds can be allocated to the project.
62
 Freeway opponents 
have been successful in stopping freeway construction through cities 
using these environmental tools in some instances.
63
 Some cities, 
 
penetrating a city may offer excellent opportunity for the location” of a freeway); and AM. 
ASS’N OF STATE HIGHWAY OFFICIALS, A POLICY ON ARTERIAL HIGHWAYS IN URBAN AREAS 
89–90 (1957) (same). 
 57. Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966) (creating 
the Department of Transportation).  
 58. Section 4(f), 80 Stat. at 934. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Section 4(f) states, in pertinent part: 
After the effective date of this Act, the Secretary shall not approve any program or 
project which requires the use of any land from am public part, recreation area, 
wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site unless (1) there is no feasible and 
prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible 
planning to minimize harm to such park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl 
refuge, or historic site resulting from such use. 
80 Stat. at 934 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 138(a) (2012)). Nearly identical language to 
the Section 4(f) language codified in Title 23 (Highways) is also found in Title 29 
(Transportation). See 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2012) (“The Secretary may approve a transportation 
program or project . . . only if (1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; 
and (2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm . . . .”). Because 
of common usage and familiarity, the term “Section 4(f)” continues to be used by the 
Department of Transportation in matters relating to both 23 U.S.C. § 138 and 49 U.S.C. § 303. 
 61. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012)). 
 62. NEPA provides that a report detailing the environmental and social impacts of the 
proposed project be filed for all “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). 
 63. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (preventing 
the construction of Interstate 40 through a Memphis Park); Gibson, supra note 56, at 726. In 
Milwaukee, freeway opponents succeeded in halting the construction of Park Freeway West 
days before construction contracts were to be issued based on the requirement for an 
environmental impact statement under NEPA, despite the fact that most of the land had been 
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however, managed to thwart these environmental safeguards and 
proceed with their urban routes. For example, in San Antonio, Texas, 
Interstate 281 was successfully constructed through Breckenridge-
Olmos Park despite the opponents’ challenge to the project under 
Section 4(f).
64
 Through congressional action, local authorities were 
able to construct the originally designated route through the park by 
bifurcating the highway project.
65
 The highway segments on either 
end of the park remained federally funded, while the middle segment 
running through the park was solely state-funded.
66
  
B. Modern Transportation Legislation (ISTEA to MAP-21) 
In 1991, Congress marked the end of the Interstate Highway Era.
67
 
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 
(ISTEA)
68
 shifted the planning focus away from state governments, 
which largely favor traditional automotive projects to accommodate 
vehicular demand,
69
 to a local or regional focus by requiring greater 
 
acquired and homes removed prior to NEPA’s enactment. RICHARD W. CUTLER, GREATER 
MILWAUKEE’S GROWING PAINS, 1950–2000: AN INSIDER’S VIEW 83 (2001).  
 64. Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc. v. Tex. Highway 
Dep’t, 446 F.2d 1013, 1029 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 65. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–87, 87 Stat. 250, § 154. Section 
154, “Termination of Federal-Aid Relationship,” was added to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 
1973, as a means for Texas to build its freeway without Federal-Aid funds and the requirements 
under Section 4(f). Section 154 stated that “The Contractual Relationship Between the Federal 
and State Governments shall be ended with respect to all portions of the San Antonio North 
Expressway between Interstate Highway 35 and Interstate Loop 410, and the expressway shall 
cease to be a federal–aid project.” § 154.  
 66. See Mashaw, supra note 43, at 36–37. 
 67. S. REP. NO. 102-71, at 4 (1991). Jerry Mashaw summarizes prior Federal-Aid 
Highway legislation succinctly:  
The Congress has had something to say about local preferences, environmental and 
social considerations, and public participation. But the crucial question, “to build or 
not to build,” is one of preference and power. The Federal-Aid Highways Acts largely 
reinforce the power of state legislatures and highway departments to act on their 
preferences.  
Mashaw, supra note 43, at 21–22. 
 68. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), Pub. L. No. 
102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (current version at 23 U.S.C. §§ 101–166 (2012)). 
 69. Benjamin K. Olson, The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century: The Failure 
of Metropolitan Planning Organizations to Reform Federal Transportation Policy in 
Metropolitan Areas, 28 TRANSP. L.J. 147, 148 (2000). There are several studies that suggest 
that the construction of new roads or widening of roads to accommodate capacity is largely 
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participation of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs).
70
 
ISTEA tied transportation funds to a requirement that MPOs work in 
conjunction with state and public transportation officials in creating a 
long-term transportation improvement plan.
71
 ISTEA’s goals 
balanced increased economic development and productivity with 
environmental standards and social benefits to ensure transportation 
decisions were made “with insistent attention to the concepts of 
innovation, competition, energy efficiency, productivity, growth, and 
accountability.”72  
ISTEA’s successor, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st 
Century (TEA-21),
73
 authorized the federal surface transportation 
programs for highways, highway safety, and transit for another six-
year period, ending in 2003. TEA-21 significantly increased the 
federal contribution to transportation projects
74
 and reworked some of 
 
offset by induced traffic. See Michael Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just an Environmental 
Issue, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 301, 368 (2000). See also Stephen H. Burrington, Restoring the Rule 
of Law and Respect for Communities in Transportation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 691, 702–03 
(1996) (noting that highway capacity induces new and longer trips, and promotes sprawl). 
 70. Intermodal Surface Transportation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240, Title I, 
§1024(a), 1025(a), 105 Stat. 1914 (requiring a formal metropolitan transportation planning 
process conducted by MPOs). MPOs are federally mandated organizations that serve, at a 
minimum, as a designated urban area’s “policy board” with respect to its transportation 
planning. See 23 U.S.C. § 134(b)(2) (2012). Every urban area of fifty thousand or more people 
is required to have an MPO. 23 U.S.C. § 134(d)(1). MPOs come in various shapes and sizes 
(and levels of collaboration with neighboring MPOs), which may depend on the needs of the 
urban area they serve and the deliverables required by federal statute. For example, an MPO 
that exists within a region that also in non-attainment status based on National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards has additional obligations under the Clean Air Act. See 41 U.S.C. § 7506(c) 
(2012). Federal law requires that an MPO’s policy board consist of “local elected officials; 
officials of public agencies that administer or operate major modes of transportation . . . ; and 
appropriate State officials.” 23 U.S.C. 134(d)(2). Federal law is otherwise silent on board 
composition, voting rights, and general governance, although many states have statutes that 
regulate MPOs’ governance and a number of other subject areas. See ALEXANDER BOND, JEFF 
KRAMER & KAREN SEGGERMAN, STAFFING AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY OF 
METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATIONS Tbl. 2-6 (2010), available at 
https://www.planning.dot.gov/ documents/Staffing_Administrative_Capacity_MPOs.pdf (a 
thorough summary of MPOs, their composition and administration based on extensive survey 
results). 
 71. 23 U.S.C. § 134(c). 
 72. Declaration of Policy: Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, Section 2, 
105 Stat. 1914. See also Olson, supra note 69, at 154. 
 73. Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 
Stat. 107 (1998) (current version at 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-166 (2012)). 
 74. See Olson, supra note 69, at 156. TEA-21 authorized $217 billion for transportation 
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ISTEA’s policies in the area of transportation planning, giving 
greater autonomy to local planning agencies.
75
 While TEA-21 
continued on the path forged by ISTEA to provide for more 
flexibility in the use of federal transportation funds, it is debatable 
whether it significantly changed the federal government’s 
commitment to highway construction.
76
  
The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-
21), is the most recently enacted transportation bill.
77
 It allocates 
nearly $40 billion for each fiscal year 2013 and 2014 to fund federal-
aid highways and highway safety construction programs.
78
 MAP-21 
is the first long-term highway authorization enacted since 2005.
79
 
MAP-21 “creates a streamlined and performance-based surface 
transportation program”80 by consolidating funding programs and 
imposing a maximum four-year environmental review process to 
speed up project development.
81
   
 
spending over five years, as compared to ISTEA’s $150 billion over the previous seven years. 
Id. In addition, TEA-21 guaranteed the states a minimum amount of funding, something that 
ISTEA was unable to achieve. Liam A. McCann, TEA-21: Paving Over Efforts to Stem Urban 
Sprawl and Reduce America’s Dependence on the Automobile, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 857, 863 (1999). 
 75. See Olson, supra note 69, at 156, for a explanation of the differences in ISTEA and 
TEA-21, especially with regard to the role of regional transportation planning and community 
involvement. 
 76. See McCann, supra note 76, at 857–58 for an argument that TEA-21 was a wasted 
opportunity to develop a sustainable transportation policy because the dedication of funds 
remains predominantly focused on highway construction, a path state governments will likely 
continue to chose in their discretionary capacity over alternative transportation projects.  
 77. The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), Pub. L. No. 112-
141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012) (current version at 23 U.S.C. §§ 101–166 (2012)). 
 78. § 1101, 126 Stat. at 414 (indicating that over $37.5 billion dollars for the highway 
program and $750 million for transportation infrastructure be allocated in 2013, and similar 
figures for 2014). 
 79. MAP-21 replaced TEA-21’s successor, The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 
1839 (2005). SAFETEA-LU expired in 2009 but Congress continued to renew its funding 
formulas until the enactment of MAP-21. See David Tanner, It’s Official; the U.S. Has a New 
Transportation Law, LAND LINE MAG. (July 6, 2012), available at http://www.landlinemag. 
com/Story. aspx?StoryID=23862#.VUpdzdpViko. 
 80. MAP-21 Performance Requirements Summary, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/tpm/about/summary.cfm (last updated Mar. 5, 2013). 
 81. A Summary of Highway Provisions, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/map21/summaryinfo.cfm. 
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II. SUCCESSFUL REMOVAL PROJECTS 
Initial urban highway removal projects began in the 1970s and 
1980s and focused on pre-Interstate constructions. The first of these 
early projects occurred in Portland, Oregon, where community 
activists advocated for the removal of the inner-city Harbor Drive to 
open up the waterfront for parks and recreation.
82
 Despite heavy 
traffic flows on Harbor Drive,
83
 it was removed in 1974 and replaced 
with a greenway. The Harbor Drive removal laid the foundation for 
Portland’s successful urban revitalization.84  
In the 1980s, New York and Boston attempted to deal with their 
failing pre-interstate highways by burying them. In 1973, New 
York’s elevated West Side Highway, constructed in the early 1930s, 
was torn down after a heavily loaded truck fell through the 
roadway.
85
 Efforts to rebuild the roadway via underground tunnel 
were met with environmental challenges,
86
 and the West Side 
Highway was eventually replaced with an at-grade boulevard, 
completed in 2001.
87
 In Boston, city officials decided in the early 
1970s to replace the pre-interstate elevated Central Artery with a 
 
 82. Portland’s community activists benefited from strong political backing out of the gate. 
See ROSE & MOHL, supra note 26, at 180. Thomas L. McCall, a former journalist and 
environmental activist, was a proactive state governor who initiated an exploratory task force in 
1968. Id. Neil E. Goldschmidt, a former poverty lawyer and city councilman, took the lead after 
he was elected as Portland’s mayor in 1972. Id. 
 83. As an argument against removal, highway engineers estimated daily traffic of ninety 
thousand vehicles in the near future. Following the removal of Harbor Drive, its traffic 
dispersed without incident, especially with the viable alternative of Interstate 5, which ran 
through an industrial area along the riverfront’s opposite bank. Id. 
 84. See 6 CASE STUDIES IN URBAN FREEWAY REMOVAL, SEATTLE URB. MOBILITY PLAN 
6B (2008), available at http://www.seattle.gov/transportation/docs/ump/06%20SEATTLE 
%20Case%20 studies%20in%20urban%20freeway%20removal.pdf [hereinafter SEATTLE CASE 
STUDIES] (following Harbor Drive’s removal, the Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal 
Area’s “assessed land values in downtown Portland have increased an average of 10.4% 
annually, from a total of $466 million to more than $1.6 billion”). 
 85. CASE STUDIES OF URBAN FREEWAYS FOR THE I-81 CHALLENGE, SYRACUSE METRO. 
TRANSP. COUNCIL 27 (2010), available at http://www.thei81challenge.org/cm/ResourceFiles/ 
resources/Case StudiesReport_3-02-10.pdf [hereinafter I-81 CHALLENGE CASE STUDIES]. 
 86. ROSE & MOHL, supra note 26, at 181. Following an environmental impact statement, 
a judge declared the construction of a submerged tunnel could potentially harm the Hudson 
River’s striped bass population. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011 
(2d Cir. 1983). 
 87. West Side (Joe DiMaggio) Highway Historic Overview, NY CROSSROADS, 
http://www.nycroads.com/roads/west-side/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
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series of tunnels.
88
 Termed the “Big Dig” project, construction began 
in 1987 and was not completed until 2003, amidst criticism of 
expense, delay, and poor urban planning.
89
 
In the 1990s and early part of 2000s, San Francisco removed two 
elevated freeways, The Central Freeway and the Embarcadero 
Freeway, replacing them with boulevards.
90
 Both were opened 1959, 
with only partially completed portions of the originally planned 
routes due to earlier citizen-initiated “freeway revolts.”91 The catalyst 
for their removal was the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake, which 
created structural damage to both the Central Freeway and the 
Embarcadero.
92
  
The Central Freeway carried approximately one hundred thousand 
cars per day during peak hours until the earthquake required 
demolition of a damaged section.
93
 Local politicians and citizen 
activists began to propose alternatives for the remaining elevated 
structure in lieu of the state’s planned seismic retrofit.94 Their 
argument for the replacement of the elevated highway was 
strengthened when in 1996, a segment was closed for four months to 
demolish a portion of the freeway’s upper deck and none of the 
anticipated gridlock materialized.
95
 In 1999, the freeway’s fate was 
left to the voters, who rejected a ballot initiative to retrofit the Central 
 
 88. ROSE & MOHL, supra note 26, at 181.  
 89. Id. On the Big Dig: 
The thirty acres where the Central Artery once stood became contested ground for 
planners and developers. In the end the swath of land became a wide urban park 
named the Rose Kennedy Greenway. . . Sadly, urban planners have replicated on land 
what highway planners had created in the Central Artery a half-century earlier . . . a 
fancy median strip flanked by four-lane boulevards. Without the mix of density and 
activity requisite for successful cities, the land still divides. 
LEWIS, supra note 8, at 307–08. 
 90. ROSE & MOHL, supra note 26, at 182 
 91. SEATTLE CASE STUDIES, supra note 84, at 6C-D. 
 92. ROSE & MOHL, supra note 26, at 182; see also DIMENTO & ELLIS, supra note 1, at 
223, 225. 
 93. SEATTLE CASE STUDIES, supra note 84, at 6C.  
 94. Id. “Seismic retrofitting is the modification of existing structures to make them more 
resistant to seismic activity, ground motion or soil failure due to earthquakes.” RAJA RIZWAN 
HUSSAIN, MUHAMMAD WASIM & SAEED HASAN, COMPUTER AIDED SEISMIC AND FIRE 
RETROFITTING ANALYSIS OF EXISTING HIGH RISE REINFORCED CONCRETE BUILDINGS 5 
(2016). 
 95. SEATTLE CASE STUDIES, supra note 84, at 6C. 
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Freeway, and instead elected to remove the freeway and replace it 
with an at-grade boulevard.
96
 The freeway’s removal allowed for the 
reconnection of residential neighborhoods, the revitalization of a 
commercial area, increased property values, and the construction of a 
new park and one thousand new housing units.
97
 
The Embarcadero Freeway carried sixty thousand vehicles per day 
and acted as both a physical and visual barrier to San Francisco’s 
waterfront.
98
 Prior to the earthquake, the city’s voters rejected 
demolishing the freeway.
99
 Once damage by the earthquake rendered 
the freeway temporarily inoperative, however, San Franciscans began 
to envision the city’s waterfront potential without the elevated 
freeway.
100
 Shortly thereafter, it came down.
101
 The Embarcadero’s 
replacement with a boulevard, vintage streetcar line, and a 
promenade has helped establish new surrounding neighborhoods, 
civic amenities, and tourist attractions along with new housing in the  
former freeway’s path.102  
Milwaukee’s removal of the Park East Freeway in 2003 is a more 
recent example of a completed highway removal project and shares 
similar traits and challenges facing other candidate cities for highway 
removal. Unlike New York and San Francisco, where the impetus for 
removal projects was largely the result of the need to address 
unforeseen structural damage, the Park East Freeway was an 
underused segment of freeway soon in need of a maintenance 
overhaul.
103
  
Milwaukee’s Mayor, John Norquist,104 was vehemently against 
urban freeway construction and made freeway removal a priority of 
 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 6D. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. The freeway was demolished in 1991. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. See SEATTLE CASE STUDIES, supra note 84, at 6K-2 (“The estimated cost to rebuild 
the aging freeway was $100 million. By contrast, the total cost of replacing it . . . was $25 
million. . . .”). 
 104. After serving as Milwaukee’s mayor from 1988 until 2004, John Norquist went on to 
become the president of the Congress for New Urbanism. See CNU President John Norquist to 
Step Down After a Decade, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM, https://www.cnu.org/cnu-
news/2013/12/cnu-president-john-norquist-step-down-after-decade (last updated Dec. 2, 2013). 
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his administration.
105
 There were two elevated freeway spurs on his 
removal agenda: I-794 and the Park East Freeway.
106
 Both were the 
remnants of a planned downtown loop that was never completed due 
to freeway revolt and stalemate in the 1970s.
107
 And both isolated 
recently redeveloped and promising neighborhoods from access to 
downtown.
108
 
I-794 now connected the downtown interchange over the Hoan 
Harbor Bridge along the Lake Michigan waterfront to the recently 
completed Lake Parkway, creating a new route to the airport.
109
 
While I-794 cut off Milwaukee’s historic Third Ward neighborhood 
from the downtown business district, its removal was strongly 
opposed by regional commuters
110
 along with officials of nearby 
cities whose investments in transportation projects, like the Lake 
Parkway, relied heavily on I-794 traffic.
111
  
The second project on Norquist’s agenda was the removal of Park 
East Freeway. Compared to the I-794 removal proposal, this project 
 
 105. See John O. Norquist, Tear It Down!, BLUEPRINT MAG., Dec. 2000, at 15–19. Prior to 
his becoming mayor, Norquist was a state legislator who strongly opposed to 1970s freeway 
construction in Milwaukee. ROSE & MOHL, supra note 26, at 181. Norquist felt that the city of 
Milwaukee was underrepresented in the South Eastern Wisconsin’s Regional Planning 
Commission (SEWRPC), the federally-designated MPO. CUTLER, supra note 63, at 101–02. 
While a legislator, he unsuccessfully attempted to increase Milwaukee’s (city and county) 
representation in SEWRPC, which he felt was pandering to the pro-freeway lobby to the 
detriment of the city. Id. As mayor, he sought to decertify SEWRPC as an MPO based on 
Milwaukee’s underrepresentation, but Federal Highway Administration officials rejected his 
arguments. Id.  
 106. CUTLER, supra note 63, at 106. 
 107. WIM WIEWEL & GERRIT KNAAP, PARTNERSHIP FOR SMART GROWTH: UNIVERSITY-
COMMUNITY COLLABORATION FOR BETTER PUBLIC PLACES 37 (2005). “Neither facility carried 
anything near its engineered capacity, essentially functioning as mile-long off-ramps to the 
downtown.” Id. 
 108. Id. Just south of downtown and separated by I-794, the historic Third Ward 
neighborhood began in the 1980s transforming its old industrial warehouses into loft condos, 
restaurants, and art and design spaces. Id. On the other side of downtown, just to the north of 
the Park East Freeway, the former Schlitz Brewery complex was repurposed as Schlitz Park 
consisting of a mixture of office space and condominiums. Id. 
 109. CUTLER, supra note 63, at 106–07. 
 110. I-794 carried eighty-nine thousand vehicles per day and the traffic was predominantly 
regional. Id. Replacing I-794 with a boulevard required drawbridges over the Milwaukee River 
resulting in insurmountable congestion. Id. 
 111. Id. at 107. The adjacent city of Cudahy had just spent $100 million to build Lake 
Parkway to facilitate trips from nearby municipalities and airport traffic to downtown via I-794. 
Id. 
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was publically supported as a far more reasonable endeavor.
112
 The 
Park East Freeway carried predominately local traffic at less than half 
the rate of the I-794.
113
 The land surrounding the freeway was 
undeveloped
114
 or used for surface parking lots.
115
 Moreover, 
Norquist had an appealing fiscal argument for Park East’s removal: 
tearing the freeway down would cost on $25 million, whereas making 
the necessary repairs would cost $100 million.
116
  
Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson was not an initial 
proponent of the project but quickly became one, likely when Harley 
Davidson indicated plans to build a museum along the Park East 
corridor.
117
 Perhaps Governor Thompson saw the economic value in 
the freeway’s replacement with a boulevard, as well as the 
development capacity of the twenty-three acres of land surrounding 
the corridor.
118
 In addition, Governor Thompson was in possession of 
$241 million in federally withheld transportation funds granted under 
ISTEA.
119
 The funds would soon be forfeited if not allocated to 
specific transportation projects.
120
 In 1999, the governor, the mayor, 
and the county executive negotiated a written compromise for the 
allocation of the ISTEA funds to the Park East removal.
121
 In return, 
the I-794 spur would remain intact.
122
 The Milwaukee City Council 
approved the removal of Park East by unanimous vote, and the 
County Board of Commissioners also approved the project by wide 
margin.
123
  
 
 112. Id. 
 113. CUTLER, supra note 63, at 107. 
 114. Land had been cleared for the complete freeway project that never materialized. See 
supra text accompanying note 63. 
 115. SEATTLE CASE STUDIES, supra note 84, at 6K-3. 
 116. Norquist, supra note 105, at 15. 
 117. CUTLER, supra note 63, at 107–08. 
 118. Id. at 107. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 107–08. 
 122. See Larry Sandler, Deal Creates Different Fates for Freeways, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, May 3, 1999, at B1. 
 123. CUTLER, supra note 63, at 108. 
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Demolition of Park East was delayed until 2002, mostly due to 
legal challenges raised by local businessman George Watts.
124
 Watts 
unsuccessfully challenged the environmental assessment process 
required by NEPA
125
 in an effort to delay construction,
126
 and later 
challenged Park East’s removal based on alleged negative impact on 
commuters and businesses.
127
 Despite these challenges, the project 
moved forward and Milwaukee completed the demolition of Park 
East Freeway in 2003.
128
 The replacement boulevard was completed 
and opened to traffic by January 2006.
129
 
Development within the three new neighborhoods created by Park 
East Freeway’s removal has been slower than anticipated.130 One 
probable reason for the slow development was the economic collapse 
in 2008, which hampered real estate projects that began just two 
years before.
131
 Another likely reason for the slow development of 
the neighborhood was the disconnect between the development 
objectives of the city and the county in regards to the land each 
controlled.
132
 Milwaukee County has implemented, by legislation, a 
 
 124. Larry Sandler, Watts Campaigns to Save Park East Spur, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
Jul. 10, 2000, at 3B [hereinafter Watts Campaigns]. Watts challenged Mayor Norquist in the 
2000 mayoral election predominately on the basis of the Park East freeway removal, and lost. 
Id.  
 125. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). 
 126. Sandler, Watts Campaigns, supra note 124. 
 127. Larry Sandler, Watts Loses Fight to Save Spur, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 19, 
2002, at 5B. 
 128. Christopher J. Bessert, Milwaukee Freeways: Park East, WIS. HIGHWAYS, 
http://www.wisconsinhighways.org/milwaukee/park.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2009). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See City Prods County About Park East Delays, BIZTIMES.COM (Jan. 15, 2007), 
http://www.biztimes.com/article/20070115/ENEWSLETTERS02/ 301159998/ (last modified 
Mar. 14, 2012); and Sean Ryan, Momentum Picks Up in Park East, MILWAUKEE BUS. J. (July 
12, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/print-edition/2013/07/12/momentum-picks-
up-in-park-east.html?page=all. 
 131. See Sean Ryan, A Ray of Hope: Projects Proposed for Park East, But Financing Still 
a Challenge, MILWAUKEE BUS. J. (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/print-
edition/2011/02/04/a-ray-of-hope-projects-proposed-for.html?page=all.  
 132. See Mark Kass, The Park East Runaround: Why Nothing is Happening There, 14 WIS. 
INT. MAG. 41, 41, 43–44 (Spring 2005), available at http://www.wpri.org/WIInterest/ 
Kas14.2.pdf; and Tom Daykin, Park East Development Kicks into High Gear with a New 
Marketing Campaign, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 18, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/ 
business/park-east-development-kicks-into-high-gear-with-a-new-marketing-campaign-709v4j3 
-208008131.html (“[A] new bill passed by the Legislature will limit the County Board’s role in 
selling land, including Park East parcels. The bill’s supporters say that will help encourage 
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2015]  21st Century Futurama 225 
 
 
community benefits agreement (CBA) imposed on any developer of 
land owned by the county in the Park East Corridor.
133
 The City of 
Milwaukee has no CBA in place for the parcels of land it owns.
134
 
Thus, the lack of a unified development plan and differing 
requirements for parcels of land within the same development area 
appears to have contributed to slower investment, but the prospects 
for positive development still remain favorable.
135
 
A. Additional Resources: Locally targeted federal funds through 
TIGER Grants 
Since 2009, cities contemplating highway removal projects have 
had the opportunity to apply for Transportation Investment 
Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) discretionary grants.
136
 The 
 
more development. . . .”). Milwaukee County acquired the land for the spur’s initial 
construction from the federal government, so when the Park East Freeway was demolished, the 
land comprised of the freeway’s footprint reverted back to the county. WIEWEL & KNAAP, 
supra note 107, at 41. The surrounding parcels of land either belonged to the city or were 
privately owned. See Tom Daykin & Knight Ridder, Park East Area Improvements to Cost 
More, CHI. TRIB. (May 16, 2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-05-16/business/ 
0405160285_1_michael-wisniewski-million-in-new-development-freeway-stub (the city owns 
four acres of land in the Park East redevelopment area, compared to the County’s sixteen acres). 
 133. Milwaukee Park East Redevelopment CBA, CMTY. BENEFITS AGREEMENTS BLOG 
(Jan. 30, 2008), http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com/2008/01/milwaukee-park-east-
redevelopment-cba.html (highlighting Milwaukee County’s CBA requirements to Park East 
developers: provide living wages to construction jobs, incorporate green design elements into 
buildings, provide affordable housing, and contribute to community programs). 
 134. Id.  
 135. See Andrew Welland, County’s Park East Land Is a Development Dead Zone, 
BIZTIMESMEDIA (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.biztimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/2009 
0115/BLOGS/301159987/image1.gif/&template=printart. 
 136. See About TIGER Grants, DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/tiger/about (last 
visited May 4, 2015). Historically, Congress determines how much federal highway spending 
each state receives through the use of formulas (accounting for roughly four-fifths of the 
distributed funds) and appropriations to special-purpose programs and specific projects. See 
Chad Shirley, Cong. Budget Office, Spending and Funding for Highways, in ECONOMIC AND 
BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF 2 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/01-19-
highwayspending_brief.pdf. Funds allocated by formula are used for various purposes, 
including highways and bridges (construction, improvement, and maintenance), safety, 
pollution reduction, transportation planning, and alternative forms of transportation. Id. The 
formula amounts allocated for a particular purpose are also based on different criteria “such as 
each state’s share of highway lane-miles, vehicle-miles traveled, fuel use, population, or 
contributions to the Highway Trust Fund.” Id. The states can then determine the specific 
projects their allocated funds will serve. Id. Alternative methods for Congress to allocate the 
remaining one-fifth of the available transportation funds to special programs or individual 
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TIGER grant program was initiated as part of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
137
 and to date, has received over $4.1 
billion to invest in transit programs that “promise to achieve critical 
national objectives.”138 Selected projects are typically multi-modal, 
multi-jurisdictional, or otherwise difficult to fund through 
traditionally available programs.
139
 Eligible applicants include not 
just state, but also local governments, transit agencies, metropolitan 
planning organizations, and groups representing multiple states or 
jurisdictions.
140
 TIGER funds are awarded to grant applicants on a 
competitive basis for projects demonstrating valuable long-term 
outcomes.
141
 Criteria considerations for awarding TIGER grants 
include minimizing “life-cycle” costs of repair and maintenance, 
contributing to the nation’s economic competitiveness, fostering 
livable communities, promoting environmental sustainability, and 
improving safety.
142
 The Department of Transportation has awarded 
TIGER grants to approximately forty to sixty projects annually 
throughout its five years in operation. Among those grants, only four 
have been designated to highway removal projects, either for 
planning purposes or actual removal.
143
  
 
projects include programs such as TIGER, and the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and 
Innovation Act (TIFIA), a program “designed to attract private investment, particularly to 
projects that create new capacity.” Id. 
 137. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 
203–04 (2009). 
 138. About TIGER Grants, supra note 136. Funding for TIGER grant rounds since its 
inception are as follows: $1.5 billion for TIGER I grants; $600 million for TIGER II grants; 
$526.994 million for FY 2011; $500 million for FY 2012; $473.847 million for FY 2013; and 
$600 million for FY 2014. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See Tiger Grant Application Resources, DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/ 
tiger/application-resources (last updated May 23, 2013). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  
 143. See FY 2010 TIGER Capital Grants, DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation. 
gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/TIGER_CAPITAL_GRANTS_2010.pdf (last updated June 14, 
2013) (New Haven, CT, for highway removal and boulevard replacement); FY 2010 TIGER 
Planning Grants, DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/ 
TIGER%202%20Planning%20GRANTS%20Highlights.pdf (last updated June 14, 2013) (New 
Orleans, LA, to study potential infrastructure investments along elevated I-10 expressway); FY 
2011 TIGER Awards, DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/ 
docs/TIGER_2011_AWARD.pdf (last updated Feb. 19, 2013) (St. Louis, MO, for roadway 
improvement that “reconnects the Arch Grounds and the Mississippi River with the Downtown 
Core,” although not specifically highway removal); TIGER 2013 Awards Fact Sheet, DEP’T OF 
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A potential hindrance for a community seeking a TIGER grant for 
freeway removal is inability to demonstrate project readiness. To 
ensure the Department of Transportation’s ability to obligate funds 
before the end of the fiscal year, grant applicants are strongly 
recommended to include “concrete evidence of project milestones 
achieved and remaining” in their proposals.144 For example, the city 
of Rochester, New York unsuccessfully applied for TIGER grants in 
2009 and 2011 to fund its proposal to convert a portion of the 
depressed Inner Loop Expressway, described as “a noose, strangling 
the downtown area,” into an at-grade boulevard.145 Rochester finally 
received the TIGER grant in 2013.
146
 It showed readiness when 
Rochester’s mayor dedicated two million dollars in city funds and 
federal highway aid to fund a final design, thereby boosting 
Rochester’s competitiveness.147 
III. ANALYSIS/PROPOSAL 
Urban freeway removal is an opportunity to redress the 
environmental and social justice harms that resulted in large part 
from early highway policy and American’s dependence on the 
automobile. A successful urban freeway removal project can have 
lasting beneficial social and economic impacts for a city. 
 
TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/TIGER_2013_FactSheets.pdf 
(last updated Nov. 2, 2013) (Rochester, NY, for removal of segment of inner loop depressed 
expressway and boulevard replacement). 
 144. TIGER 2013 NOFA: Project Readiness, DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation. 
gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/TIGER%202013%20NOFA_ProjReadiness%20 Guidance_0.pdf (last 
updated May 9, 2013). 
 145. Zack Seward, Rochester Doubling Down on Inner Loop Plans, INNOVATION TRAIL 
(Feb. 14, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://innovationtrail.org/post/rochester-doubling-down-inner-loop-
plans. 
 146. See Federal Funding Announced for Inner Loop Project, RECONNECT ROCHESTER 
BLOG (Aug. 30, 2013), http://reconnectrochester.org/blog/2013/08/federal-funding-announced-
for-inner-loop-project/.  
 147. See generally Seward, supra note 145. In addition to funding a final design plan, the 
mayor successfully built a coalition of diverse stakeholders and influential politicians like 
Senator Chuck Schumer, who advocated the grant award for Rochester in a meeting with 
Department of Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx. See Angie Schmitt, Will the Feds 
Support Rochester’s Downtown Highway Teardown?, STREETSBLOGUSA (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://dc.streetsblog.org/2013/08/29/will-the-feds-support-rochesters-downtown-highway-tear 
down/. 
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Reconnecting city grids can reintegrate communities that were 
alienated and further disadvantaged by the freeway’s initial 
construction, and even create new neighborhoods.
148
 Absent physical 
barriers that freeways create, local residents can have greater mobility 
and access to economic opportunities in city centers. Commuters too 
will have greater opportunity access to downtown businesses that 
they would have otherwise bypassed on a restricted access freeway 
route.
149
 Successful removal projects have resulted in an increase of 
surrounding property values and the construction of hundreds or even 
thousands of new housing units on land otherwise occupied by 
freeways.
150
 The removal of waterfront freeways, completed 
successfully in San Francisco, and underway in Seattle and St. Louis, 
arguably provide an even greater city-wide benefit (and may also be 
met with greater initial support) than inner-city removal projects with 
benefits largely targeting the proximate neighborhoods.
151
 
Waterfronts are among a city’s greatest assets, and a developed 
waterfront can not only spur recreation and economic investment 
amongst its citizens but can also generate greater tourism 
opportunities. 
A major hurdle for cities contemplating freeway removal is 
overcoming the entrenched pro-freeway stance generally held by 
suburban commuters, the construction industry, and state government 
and transportation officials who ultimately control the funds.
152
 Cities 
can counteract these obstacles in initial contemplation stages by 
initiating a robust public relations campaign to capture the attention 
of local and state political actors, and harness the support of affected 
community members, businesses, and other stakeholders. While cities 
must initiate the need for freeway removal, the keeper of federal 
 
 148. See, e.g., Turning Brownfields into Opportunities for Urban Revitalization: The North 
End and Park East Corridor in Milwaukee, P’SHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE CMTY., 
http://www.sustainablecommunities.gov/pdf/studies/milwaukee.pdf (last updated June 25, 
2012). 
 149. See, e.g., Inner Loop East Project, CITY OF ROCHESTER, http://www.cityof 
rochester.gov/InnerLoopEast/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2014). 
 150. See generally Ebeling, supra note 4.  
 151. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 152. Id.  
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monies and the ultimate decision maker is the state government and 
transportation authority.  
Every city is different. Each has experienced a different history of 
highway construction in its urban center, and each contends with 
different social, economic, and environmental effects of that 
construction. Furthermore, while every city can benefit from the 
potential urban revitalization that removing an urban freeway can 
advance, all differ in both the amount of economic resources 
available to dedicate to a project and the amount of political support 
for a project at the local, state, and federal level.
153
  
Cities contemplating freeway removal look to completed projects 
for comparison,
154
 and it is clear that a project’s success is determined 
by the convergence of several variables: the freeway is or is soon to 
be in some form of disrepair, either because it has reached the end of 
its design life or it otherwise sustains unexpected structural damage; 
mobility for commuters will not be significantly impaired; local 
political actors value benefits associated with removal over 
maintaining the status quo; and, there exists an active group of 
stakeholders with a concrete development plan.
155
  
Currently, urban freeway removal lacks a solid foundation in our 
national transportation policy. Embedding urban freeway removal in 
the national transportation policy would put cities with local support 
for a removal project on more equal footing to initiate projects and 
more readily access federal financial support. The transportation 
policy should be amended at the federal level to reflect this 
burgeoning trend affecting the urban environment. 
ISTEA and its successors took a significant step in changing the 
direction of transportation policy. Congress recognized that the 
primary objective of the previous transportation policy under the 
Federal-Air Highway Acts was achieved: a national network of 
highways in the name of commerce and national defense has been 
created. ISTEA aimed at achieving greater incorporation of multi-
 
 153. See SEATTLE CASE STUDIES, supra note 84, at 6G, in which Seattle distinguishes its 
economic position from that of Chattanooga, TN when comparing its proposed waterfront 
highway removal to Chattanooga’s.  
 154. See id. at 6A-6K. 
 155. Francesca Napolitan & P. Christopher Zegras, Shifting Urban Priorities?: The 
Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States, 2046 J. TRANSP. RES. BOARD 68 (2008). 
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mode transportation projects to promote energy efficient and 
environmentally sensitive mobility while improving productivity and 
economic competitiveness.
156
 But the highways must be maintained, 
and at a significant cost.
157
 A majority of transportation funds 
allocated under the current ISTEA regime are used by state 
governments and state departments of transportation to repair and 
maintain highways and bridges, and in some cases, build new ones.
158
 
State governments’ primary transportation concerns are in the areas 
of traffic flow and road safely; they do not necessarily share their 
cities’ perspectives on the continued need for certain urban routes or 
on the additional non-traffic oriented benefits of their removal.
159
  
The TIGER grant program is evidence that urban freeway removal 
has a place in the national transportation policy. The largest TIGER 
grant to date was awarded to Rochester for the removal of a portion 
of its inner belt freeway. TIGER’s ability to deliver money quickly to 
projects that would otherwise have difficulty securing funds makes 
the grant program an essential component to the urban freeway 
removal movement. However, if the grant is for actual demolition 
and development plans rather than a study of alternatives to an 
existing freeway spur a city’s proposal must be detailed, scheduled, 
and ready to move forward should a grant be awarded. These 
requirements make sense considering TIGER’s spending authority; 
however, the requirements put tremendous pressure on a city to 
dedicate resources to develop a plan that it may not be able to achieve 
without the grant funds. 
The national transportation policy should be revised to 
specifically grant decision-making authority to regional 
transportation authorities.
160
 Regional transportation authorities can 
be democratically elected regional legislatures, rather than boards 
 
 156. Declaration of Policy: Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, Pub. L. 102-
240, § 2 (1991). 
 157. Ebeling, supra note 4, at 6. 
 158. Id. at 8–10. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Some states have created regional transportation authorities with decision-making 
authority by state law. Georgia is an example. See Donald Lee Biola, Georgia Regional 
Transportation Authority Act: Provide for a Regional Transportation Authority, 16 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 233 (1999). 
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consisting of state and agency appointed members.
161
 States can 
delegate transportation spending authority to regional transportation 
bodies, converting the role of the state department of transportation to 
an intermediary between regional authorities and the rest of the state 
or other designated regions.
162
 Such reorganization would alleviate 
the top-down decision-making approach currently in practice and 
ensure that metropolitan citizens’ views on highway removal are 
represented in local decision making on highway removal.  
The national transportation policy should require the feasibility of 
urban freeway removal projects within the role of Metropolitan 
Planning Organizations (MPOs). The purpose of MPOs is to 
incorporate a regional perspective into the transportation process; 
however, they are rarely in a position to exert political pressure on 
the state governments who created them. State authorities acting as 
ultimate decision makers can undermine MPOs’ views and 
proposals.
163
  
Currently, MPOs are tasked with maintaining a metropolitan 
transportation plan with at least a twenty-year vision, as well as 
creating a transportation improvement plan (TIP), which describes a 
proposed list of federally supported projects and strategies to achieve 
performance objectives identified in the metropolitan transportation 
plan.
164
 The inclusion of a freeway removal proposal in a TIP is a 
prerequisite for the allocation of federal funds to the project, however 
the decision of whether to select that project is ultimately approved 
by the state “in cooperation with the [MPO].”165 The current 
transportation policy clearly emphasizes collaborative decision-
making but does not mandate it, leaving MPOs, and the cities they 
represent, little political clout.  
 
 161. Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1814–15 
(2002). 
 162. Id. at 1818. Frug opines that a regional legislature’s “tasks would be to confront the 
basic political issues raised by the design of the transportation network, to forge a regional 
perspective on the key disputes, and to expand the existing framework to related issues like land 
use.” Id. at 1819. 
 163. Id. at 1818. 
 164. 23 U.S.C. § 134(c) (2012). 
 165. 23 U.S.C. § 134 (k)(4)(B). 
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Federal transportation legislation provides an opportunity for 
states and MPOs to, “while fitting the needs and complexity of its 
community, voluntarily elect to develop multiple scenarios for 
consideration as part of the development of the metropolitan 
transportation plan.”166 This allowance clearly encapsulates freeway 
removal proposals, but federal legislation should do more than 
provide the option for suggesting alternatives for freeway segments 
reaching the end of their design life. Instead, MPOs should be 
required to examine the merits of repurposing segments of urban 
freeway identified as reaching the end of its design life or otherwise 
in need of significant commitment of federal aid funds for 
preservation. MPOs that work in tandem with a regional 
transportation authority as the primary project approver, or in the 
alternative, MPOs with policy-setting authority divorced from state 
government control, will allow for local activists and political 
officials to gain initial traction on urban freeway removal and 
redevelopment projects.  
CONCLUSION 
Urban freeway removal as a step toward, and means of, urban 
renewal is receiving increased attention in urban development policy. 
Many urban freeways are reaching the end of their design life and 
are, or will soon be, in need of major structural maintenance and 
repair. In contemplating next steps, cities are at a crossroads. 
Depending on the functionality of the freeway in lieu of its social, 
economic, and environmental impacts, cities must ask, does it make 
more sense to repair the road or repurpose the freeway space? The 
history of, and shifts in, highway policy demonstrate both the impetus 
for, and effects of, urban freeway construction, along with the need to 
view transportation policy within a greater societal context. 
Completed urban freeway removal projects, of which there are now 
only a handful, illustrate both keys to success and hurdles that 
removal policy proponents must overcome. Federal action to shift 
metropolitan transportation decision-making authority from state 
departments of transportation to regional transportation authorities, or 
 
 166. 23 U.S.C. § 134 (i)(4)(A) (optional scenario development). 
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to allocate greater autonomy to the current MPO regime, will help 
cities with local public and political support for freeway removal to 
alleviate funding and authorization difficulties. Incorporating urban 
freeway removal solidly within national transportation policy will not 
only help create more efficient, sustainable, and prosperous cities, but 
it may also contribute to a much needed shift away from America’s 
dependence on the automobile.   
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